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The following article, reprinted here with pennission, appeared in the special Centennial Issue of
Michigan Law Review (Vol.

100,

No. 7, June 2002) .

This special edition includes articles by seven Law
School professors: Edward H. Cooper ("Simplified
I

Rules of Federal Procedure?"), Yale Kamisar ("The
Writings of John Barker Waite and Thomas Davies
on the Search and Seizure Exclusionary Rule"),
Thomas E. Kauper, '60 ("The Report of the Attorney
General's National Committee to Study the Antitrust
Laws: A Retrospective"), Theodore J. St. Antoine,
'54 ("Justice Frank Murphy and American Labor
Law"), James Boyd White ("What's Wrong with
Our Talk About Race? On History, Particularity,
and Affinnative Action"), James J. White, '62 [with
David Peters) ("A Footnote for Jack Dawson"),
and Christina B. Whitman, '74 ("Looking Back on
Planned Parenthood v. Casey"). Then-Dean Jeffrey

S. Lehman, '81, noted in his Foreword that each

contributor wrote of an issue "at the core of the past
century's legacy to contemporary society." In the
jointly-authored selection below, "I" refers to Professor
James J. White and "we" refers to White and coauthor David A. Peters.

A Footnote for Jack Dawson
By James J. White and David A. Peters
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ack Dawson, known to many at Michigan as Black Jack,
taught at the Law School from 1927 to 19 5 8. Much of
s work was published in the Michi9an Law Review, where
he served as a student editor during the 1923-24 academic
year. We revisit his work and provide a footnote to his
elegant writing on mistake and supervening events.
In Part I, we talk a little about Jack the man. In Part
II, we recite the nature and significance of his scholarly
work. Part III deals briefly with the cases decided in the last
20 years by American courts on impracticability, impossibility, mistake, and frustration of purpose. We focus
particularly on the afterlife of the notorious Alcoa case that
was the subject of Jack's last articles. Part IV concludes
with some speculation on the reasons for the different
responses of German and American courts to claims of
mistake or supervening events.

l

A splendid piece of work
As a Contracts student, I first met Jack Dawson
vicariously in the fall of 1959. We studied contracts from
Dawson and Harvey in mimeograph. That Contracts
casebook first brought remedies to the front of contracts
books and to the early weeks in contract courses. It so
asserted that remedies were at least as important as any
other part of contract doctrine and more important than
most.
I did not meet Jack in the flesh until almost 15 years
later when I was a visiting professor at Harvard. Having
taught for well over a decade at Harvard, Jack was
teaching at Boston University in 1973. On a snowy Sunday
morning, I was in my office at Harvard when Jack Dawson
invited me next door and, with a sly grin, pulled out a
bottle of whisky and two glasses. I think that was the
most extraordinary offer of a drink that I have ever had. It
confirmed my fantasies about Jack and made plausible all of
the stories about his delightful eccentricities. What stories
could not be true of one who offers Scotch neat at nine on
Sunday morning?
Jack came to the faculty in 1927 and served on the
faculty until 1958. Stories have it that he was offered a
salary of something like $3,000 when he was hired in
1927, but the Dean shortly told him that the school could
pay only $2,000. He came anyway. Jack's normal fare was
equity and contracts, but he also taught legal history and
comparative law.
Many legends attend Jack's time on the faculty here.
One can imagine that a Sunday morning offeror of whisky
might have his notions about school rules. Evidently,

Jack's attire once deviated so far from the acceptable that
the dean spoke to him about it (he may have neglected to
wear a suit coat to class on a warm day). In the next class
Jack showed up in a white tie and tails. I suspect that this
is merely representative of Jack's attitude toward rules he
thought to be foolish.
As a Democrat on a staunchly Republican faculty, Jack
was even more deviant than a Republican is today. And
Jack was not merely a Democrat. He was a candidate for
the House of Representatives on the Democratic ticket in
19 50 and 19 5 2. It must have rankled him that some of his
colleagues signed a newspaper advertisement opposing his
election. Ann Arbor was then as Republican as it is now
Democrat, and he was never elected to office.
His closest approach to elective office was by appointment. In the spring of 19 51, Senator Arthur Vandenberg of
Grand Rapids was on his deathbed. Governor
G. Mennen "Soapy"Williams, a student and friend of
Jack's, allegedly proposed to appoint Jack as Vandenberg's
replacement, but told Jack that it could be done only if it
were done quickly and before the influential people in the
Democratic party insisted otherwise. Supposedly, Jack told
the dean and bought a blue suit appropriate for a swearing
in after speaking to Soapy. It never happened. Whether
others intervened or Soapy changed his mind cannot be
confirmed.
He later declined an opportunity to be appointed to
the Michigan Supreme Court. Though Jack had served
admirably as both chief of the Middle East Division of the
Foreign Economic Administration during World War II
and later as an advisor to the Greek government as a representative of the Foreign Trade Administration, "to him,
there was nothing like the classroom," as the Harvard Law
School Bulletin put it in a memorial article about Dawson in
1986.
Jack was early and always a serious scholar. His first
publication in the Review must have been the product of his
research in England, where he studied as a Rhodes Scholar.
Even in his post-retirement service at Boston University,
he continued to write. By today's standards, and even
more by the standards of the time, he was prolific. By any
standards, his writing and thinking were powerful. Jack's
writing was always felicitous and, as his writing about Alcoa
shows, it was informed by a passion.
Jack Dawson was not only a fine and rigorous teacher
and scholar, he was also a politician, a teaching innovator, a
fine colleague, and, best of all, a judge of fine whisky.
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Jack Dawson the scholar
As a scholar, Jack Dawson was a man ahead of his
times. A Rhodes Scholar after he graduated from Michigan
Law School, he earned his D.Phil. from Oxford before
returning to Michigan to teach. These days, elite law
faculties overflow with multiple degrees, but in 19 31 a law
professor with a doctorate was a rare bird. His interest in
the law did not end at the water's edge, nor did he limit
himself to the legal world of the English-speaking peoples;
from the very first, his articles reflected a knowledge of
both German and French law. Dawson was also willing to
travel into the past to explore the roots of modern doctrine
and draw on history to provide lessons for contemporary
law. In an era when professors might publish only a few
articles during a career, the quantity of Jack Dawson's
publications is all the more impressive. In many of these
articles, with their historical depth and transnational
breadth, an underlying question recurs: when and to what
extent should judges do more than award damages in
contract disputes?
Answering this question took Jack into a number of
different areas in the law. In an early work, he explored
estoppel and its relation to statutes of limitation. He
maintained that though the law could allow parties to
contract away their rights under statues of limitations,
it should be willing to step in when one of the parties
sought to abuse its rights under the contract. The courts
should step in to help parties whose good faith attempts to
resolve disputes amicably were repaid by knavery. From
estoppel he moved on to mistake, arguing that rescission
or reform of a contract for mistake was the "enforcement
of an intention defectively expressed." He noted that while
courts need not necessarily enforce statues of limitations
to bar remedies for mistake, the longer an agreement
continues (or the longer the period since value changed
hands), the more a claim of mistake begins to look like a
case of buyer's remorse.
Dawson's interest in remedies was a product of his focus
on the various ways in which parties sought the upper hand
in contracting through the exertion of economic power.
The mid-1930s was not too far removed from the heyday
of doctrinal freedom of contract made so infamous in
Lochner. For Dawson (and many of his peers), the question
became how best to move from a "world of fantasy, too
orderly, too neatly contrived, and too harmonious to
correspond to reality," as he put it in a Tulane Law Review
article in 1937, towards a realm of contract law that could
control the worst abuses of economic power. As any firstyear contract students learns, duress emerged from the
Roman conception of laesio enormis, and Dawson followed
the development of that idea from Rome through medieval
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Christendom to its fruition in modern French and German
law in the early 19th century. He rooted his understanding
of modern duress in Christian condemnation of usury
but noted that usury, with its blanket condemnation of
interest, was an easier standard to apply than judicial investigation of the discrete circumstances of a single inequitable
bargain. His comparative study of French and German
doctrine introduced not only the historical antecedents
of the doctrine, but offered a compar~tive analysis of the
pitfalls of too broad a vision of duress.
Moving from the European to the American context,
after World War II Dawson wrote a body of seminal work
on duress in the United States, all published in the Michi9an
Law Review. In the first piece, he traced the historical
evolution of the concept of duress, observing that what had
come to be considered a full-fledged doctrine was in reality
a reflection of"the convergence of several lines of growth.
... [The result of which] has certainly not been a coherent
body of doctrine, unified around some central proposition;
on the contrary, the conflict and confusion in results of
decided cases seem greater than ever before ."
He sought to instill order into a morass of doctrine by
distilling from it, in the style of American Legal Realism,
some core notion open to broad application. Looking into
the tort roots of duress, Dawson found that contemporary economic duress focused upon "situations in which
an unequal exchange of values has been coerced by taking
advantage of a superior bargaining position."This insight
permitted him to assert that a more expansive notion of
duress was consonant with the policing function of the
courts, providing judges a legitimate way to intervene in
private bargains to shore up the foundations of a market
society.
This vision of state as impartial policeman led him to
discuss litigation as a form of duress. Although Dawson
recognized the right of parties to seek redress in court,
he also observed that "[t]he sanctions of civil procedure
constitute a system of state-organized coercion, supplied
to private individuals for the specific purpose of enabling
them to effectuate their demands."Though in mid-century
American criminal law there was no longer a legitimate
means of encouraging recalcitrant debtors to pay up,
Dawson was troubled by the ability of parties to use the
threat of civil litigation as a tool for obtaining more in
private settlement than they would otherwise realize in
the courts. This concern with duress was in part motivated
by a genuine fear of the ability of parties with superior
bargaining power to shift the burdens of risk and uncertainty onto the weak. Jack found the idea that the state as
neutral policeman should intervene to grant the strong the
benefit of unforeseen circumstances too much to stomach.

The solicitude for the weak and desire to ferret out the
true basis of every bargain informed the other major strand
of Dawson's research. From the first, he was interested
in the impact of inflation upon the law of contracts. As a
Rhodes Scholar in the mid-1920s, he had a ringside seat
for the hyperinflation that destroyed the German middle
class and set the stage for the rise of Hitler. His very first
publications in the Michi9an Law Review investigated judicial
attempts to reform contracts in the face of inflation .
Looking at the German courts in the period from 1915-24,
he concluded that they had done everything in their power
to ameliorate the impact of inflation, failing only when the
German economic system finally collapsed completely.
Moreover, he noted that the judicial experiments in
stemming inflation helped guide legislative responses to the
crisis. He also studied American history during the Civil
War period in an effort to glean from it some insight into
the proper judicial role in curbing the impact of inflation
on contracting parties. Distinguishing the hyperinflation of
the Confederate and Weimar periods from less dramatic
instances of monetary depreciation, he recognized the
importance of in'flation as a policy tool that could be used
as a means of debt relief (a significant issue if you consider
that he was writing in 1935). Thus, judicial intervention
that might be warranted in a period of excessive inflation
might, if inflation were moderate, be an impediment
to effective legislative or administrative policy. Because
judicial remedies for inflation undermine the "security of
transaction" necessary to the legitimacy of the contract
system, judges should refrain from intervening unless "the
influence on prices of purely monetary factors [emerges] as
a factor independent of ordinary influences of supply and
demand ."
Jack's work did not end with his exploration of the
substantive law, however. He was also keenly interested
in the craft of judging and the development of the role of
the judge over time. His History if Lay Jud9es investigates
the (to the contemporary observer) curious tradition of lay
judges in Western legal systems. In pre-modern societies,
lacking a clearly expressed vision of separation of powers,
"it was common to fuse with dispute-settlement some
rule-making and executive functions."The overlapping
functions of those entrusted with settling social disputes
meant that there was less demand for officials whose sole
function was the definition and application of the law.
Though increasingly complex societies demand greater
specialization, a residual interest in ensuring the legitimacy of law through popular participation in part explains
the continued vitality of lay participation in the judicial
process. That lay participation also permits the court to
draw on the expertise of others in making its decisions,

based on "an assumption that law is better administered if
it draws on the good sense and practical wisdom of persons
in which these qualities have not been severely warped by
excessive exposure to the law."The warping effects of a
legal education aside, Jack pointed out that the essence of
judging lies in the legitimacy of the process as well as the
efficiency of the decisions that emerge from it.
Though much of Jack's work was groundbreaking, his
ma9num opus was Oracles if the Law. Turning his attention
from lay judges to the history of the professional judiciary
and its role in the case law system, he emphasized the
"creative role of adjudication ."While the primary role
of judicial process, particularly in earlier periods, was
the peaceful resolution of social conflict "conflict itself,
though potentially dangerous, is a major source of growth
and change ." For Jack, an increased separation of judicial
from administrative and legislative functions still "requires
the legal order to take account of new values and human
needs that in society as in our private lives conflict can be
creative."This creativity, however, had its limits; turning
his comparativist's eye on France, Jack argued that when
the French courts exceeded their powers (even in the cause
of opposition to authoritarianism) they provoked a political
reaction that sought to rein in the power of the judges.
If for Jack judges could undermine themselves by being
on the one hand too timid to apply their creative powers
to new situations and on the other too bold in the incursions upon the realm of the political, where did the happy
medium lie? Ultimately, he found it in Rome.
He wrote in The Oracles if Law: "The extraordinary
achievement of the Roman jurists owed much, it seems,
to their own self-imposed limitations. They were conservatives and traditionalists, with profound respect for the
inherited tools of their craft. Through the conflicts of
opinion that were numerous among them they perfected
these tools and used them with increasing precision ....
Most of their attention was directed, not to theoretical
synthesis, but to the consistent and orderly treatment of
individual cases .. .. Their assumptions were fixed, the
main purposes of the social and political order were not to
be called in question, the system of legal ideas was too well
known to require much discussion. They were problemsolvers, working within this system and not called upon
to solve the ultimate problems of mankind's needs and
destiny. They work case by case, with patience and acumen
and profound respect for inherited tradition . Despite the
long centuries that have intervened, despite our vastly
different hopes for mankind and its future, we in the 20th
century can still profit from their work. Those who should
feel the strongest affinity for them are persons trained in
American case law."
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Taking nothing away from the wisdom and intelligence
of modern judges, Jack recognized that they stand on the
shoulders of giants. Moreover, the range of issues they
have to deal with include matters far outside their ken;
better to defer to tradition, precedent, and the knowledge
of experts.
In his last major scholarly publication, Jack revisited the
question of inflation and frustration of contract, this time in
the context of the Alcoa case (Aluminum Company efAmerica
v. Essex Group Inc . , 499 F. Supp. 53 [WD. Pennsylvania,
19801); he brought to bear both his knowledge of substantive law and his vision of the proper role of the judge
in rebuking the judge for overstepping the bounds of
prudence and the law.
The facts of Alcoa are, for the 1970s, not particularly
unusual. In the mid- 1960s, Essex Wire decided to increase
its production of aluminum wire products. In the spring of
1967, Alcoa and Essex Wire entered into a contract that
provided for Essex Wire to supply Alcoa with alumina,
which Alcoa would then smelt into [aluminum). The
price clauses of the contract included an escalator clause
providing for changes in price based on both the Wholesale
Price Index (WPI) and the average labor wages of Alcoa
employees at the plant in which the smelting was done.
(Alcoa developed its indexing system with the aid ofnowFederal Reserve Chairman Alan Greenspan. ) As a result
of the 1973 OPEC oil embargo, however, the price of oilfired electricity (the single largest non-labor cost factor in
aluminum conversion) rose dramatically and, "[a]s a result,
[Alcoa's] production costs rose greatly and unforeseeably
beyond the indexed increase in the contract price . In the
face of this inflation and a loss on the contract in 1978
(the last year of performance before the suit) of over $8
million, Alcoa sought reformation of the contract on the
grounds of mistake, frustration, and impracticability.
Finding in favor of Alcoa, Judge Teitelbaum reasoned
that the parties had in fact made a mutual mistake of fact
by agreeing that the WP! indexing formula would prove
suitable to meet their expectations. On the same facts, the
court held that Alcoa had also proved its case with regard
to frustration and impracticability. In fashioning a remedy,
however, the judge threw caution to the wind. Reasoning
that "[t)his case is novel," the court was willing to impose
its remedy out of fear that parties might otherwise refuse
to enter into a long-term contract. The court rejected
"the hoary maxim that the courts will not make a contract
for the parties." Reasoning that "in this dispute the court
has information from hindsight far superior to that which
the parties had when they made their contract," Judge
Tietelbaum concluded that "the parties may both be better
served by an informed judicial decision based on the known
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circumstances than by a decision wrenched from words
of the contract which were not chosen with a provision of
today's circumstances." His later observation that "[t]he
court gladly concedes that the parties might today evolve a
better working arrangement by negotiation than the court
can impose," provided far more prescient; Alcoa and Essex
Wire settled before the case was heard on appeal.
In analyzing Alcoa, Jack drew on hi~ comparative study
of the German legal system, this time as an example of
what not to do in providing a remedy. He claimed that
the Alcoa court, in trying to solve the contract problem
posed by the inflation of the mid-1970s, had violated three
basic precepts of contract. First, the judge intervened not
to provide a remedy for past injustice, but to impose a
prospective solution upon the parties that failed to give
form to their original intent . Second, the judge, in fashioning this relief, gave the parties a club with which to bash
one another until they came to terms on their own . Third,
such drastic judicial intervention in the contracting process
both undermines public faith in the legal system and
absolves the parties of any responsibility to negotiate over
risks that are predictable but the exact impact of which is
unforeseeable. In Dawson's view, parties should be forced
to take account of all but the most extreme inflation,
and even in those cases, remedies should be limited to
returning the injured party to the status of ex antefacto .

After Alcoa
In his article about the postwar German experience
with impracticability, frustration, mistake, and the like,
Jack criticizes the German courts for so freely rewriting
contracts that had failed because of mistake or changed
circumstances. In his first Boston article he traces the
German courts' reaction to the contract dislocations
that attended the astronomical inflation suffered by the
Germans after World War I. He notes how the German
courts, behaving like extremely naughty common law
courts, began to free parties from contracts because of
supervening causes, despite the conscious and severe
restrictions in the German Code of 1900 on freeing parties
from their contracts on such grounds.
In one of the early German cases, a seller had
contracted in 1921 to sell iron bars and to deliver half of
them in 1922. When the seller failed to deliver, the buyer
sued for specific performance in return for his payment
of the original contract price in marks. By the time the
case came before the appellate court in 1924, the buyer's
entire payment would have been worth less than a penny.
Accordingly, the court ordered the contract "revalorized"
(i.e . , ordered the lower court to require the buyer to pay
something that was roughly equivalent to the value of the

iron at the time of delivery) . This case and many more like
it were still fresh in the minds of judges and lawyers after
World War II.
The same kind of inflation that followed the First
did not follow the Second World War; instead, AngloAmerican bombing, the Allied conquest, and the sticky
fingers of the Russians nearly ruined the German economy.
Jack tells of an early postwar case that set the tone for
contract revisions. In that case, two buyers had made down
payments on Volkswagens in 1938 or 1939. Urged on by
one of Hitler's dream, they and more than 300,000 other
Germans had paid more than 250 million marks to the
company that was to manufacture the peoples' car. Part of
that money had been used to build a plant to manufacture
the Volkswagen. The factory was taken over for the war
effort, mostly destroyed by American bombing, and the
Russians expropriated the trust account that contained
all of the down payments that had been used to build the
plant . When it became clear that a postwar Volkswagen
would cost 4,400 marks, not the contracted 990, and that
the remaining down payments had been expropriated and
the plant destroyed, one might have expected the court
to turn the plaintiffs away. It did not. The high court
agreed with both parties that the "foundations" of these
contracts had been "destroyed," but instead of voiding the
contracts the court sent the case back to the lower court
to determine how many of the 300,000 potential plaintiffs could still pay or wanted Volkswagens and what they
should now pay - in addition to their down payments.
Despite the multiple problems associated with 300,000
different potential plaintiffs (some of whom wanted a car
and some who did not), the need to set a new price for
the contracts and to apportion the loss of the trust funds,
the lower was to rewrite and then enforce the rewritten
contracts.
Following the Volkswagen case, it must have seemed
child's play to rewrite other contracts that had only two
parties and called merely for setting proper mortgage
payments or adjusting sales prices. Shortly, German judges
and litigants accepted revision of contracts as a conventional remedy. Jack concludes his summary of the German
experience with this dismal description:
"[Ijt seems plain that from every point of view, courtordered 'adjustment' of frustrated contracts, as it has
now been established in Germany, is a major impairment
of freedom of contract, carried into areas for which, by
hypothesis, the contracting parties did not provide and in
which uninhibited freedom is more than usually needed."
Jack commends one German scholar's "rear guard
action" against an enemy when the "main battle was lost
more than 50 years ago."The Germans remembered

all too well their appropriate rewriting of contracts in
response to the inflation of the 1920s and applied [the same
approach] too readily to the different issues of the 19 50s.

Alcoa
Jack's discussion of Alcoa is even sharper. He notes that
the parties had negotiated an elaborate escalation clause
and that the case was hardly one of mistake - despite
the judge's assenting to the contrary. But he was most
offended by the judge's claim to have the power and
knowledge not merely to avoid the contract but to draft a
new and elaborate contract for the remaining seven years
of the Essex-Alcoa deal. The professorial advocates of
Alcoa's approach get a small share of Jack's anger.
His unhappiness with Alcoa arises from the fear that
other courts, encouraged by such a prominent decision and
by the professors' indorsement, would not only enlarge the
grounds for avoidance of contracts but also embrace Judge
Teitelbaum's claim that courts can and should fashion new
contract terms for the remaining periods in contracts that
had not yet expired when suit was filed. Undoubtedly,
Jack's fears were fed by his knowledge of the German
cases which he had studied in the 1930s and again in the
1980s. If the intellectual German judges, trained in a civil
law system and members of a society famous for its strict
obedience to rules, could ignore the directions of their
Code and so easily slip down the slope of contract revision,
surely the Americans who cared less for rules and were not
bound by a Code would slip quicker and farther.
He was wrong. Americans have not only refused to
rewrite contracts, they appear to have held the line at
avoiding them. The decisions of the last 20 years show
Jack's fears to have been ill founded.

American cases after Alcoa
Since Alcoa, there have been several disruptions of
commodity markets that have given the courts hundreds
of opportunities to hear parties' pleas to be freed from
contract obligations because of mistake or supervening
causes. Alcoa itself arose out of an increase in electricity
rates that was caused by the rise in oil process [costs] after
the Arab oil embargo. It was preceded by the Uranium
bubble that was ended by the accident at Three Mile Island
and followed by disruptions in the markets for natural gas,
coal, and electricity.
The disruption in the natural gas markets was a direct
result of government regulation of that market. In 1970,
the Congress passed the Economic Stabilization Act.
That Act fixes prices for gas sold in the interstate market.
Because the fixed prices did not justify exploration for and
development of sufficient gas reserved to satisfy demand,
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the control shortly led to shortages, and, in some cases, to
threats by public officials in the Midwest and East to punish
the gas pipelines if they did not provide enough natural
gas to heat hospitals and schools. The market was also
distorted by the fact that instrastate gas was not controlled,
so it was in the interest of producers to sell at free market
prices into the local market.
When the gas controls were lifted over a phased period
by new legislation, pipeline buyers agreed to buy gas in
long-term contracts at what proved to be improvidently
high prices. When the market escaped entirely from the
price controls and particularly when the Federal Energy
Regulatory Commission (FERC) released utility buyers
from their long-term contracts, the pipelines had longterm high cost contracts to purchase gas but no longterm buyers for the high priced gas so purchased. Those
circumstances caused Columbia Gas to file bankruptcy in
order to escape more than 4,000 long-term gas purchase
contracts at prices that far exceeded the free market price.
These circumstances also caused many buyers to breach
their "take or pay" obligations and resulted in lawsuits all
over the West.
The abrupt end to the licensing of new nuclear plants,
the shortage of natural gas, and the rise in oil prices made
utilities turn back to coal for generating electricity. The
environmental risks from soft eastern coal made utilities
use low sulfur western coal. Now well aware of the risks
of under-pricing a commodity in a long-term contract, coal
sellers seem to have achieved escalation clauses that caused
the price of western coal in those contracts to rise well
above the short-term market price. This caused buyers to
make a series of fruitless challenges to their contracts.
The contracts for the long-term sale of electricity that
were made by California, and perhaps by other western
buyers, in the summer of 2001 have yet to yield their
judicial fruit, but one can be sure that the fruit is in the
bud. In the fall of 2001 California was reported to be
selling electricity on the spot market at as little as $ 1 per
megawatt-hour that it had bought in long-term contracts
for an average of $290 per megawatt-hour. With that kind
of discrepancy between long-term prices and spot prices,
litigation cannot be far behind .
Added to the cases from contracts between buyers
and sellers of commodities in long-term contracts are the
mine-run real estate lease cases. These, of course, have
been around for more than a century, but they too offer
possibilities for a court to free one of the parties from his
lease because of unexpected circumstances.
So, have the courts gone soft, as Jack feared?We do not
think they have. Of course, the legal doctrines have hardly
changed at all. We received the doctrines of mistake,
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impossibility, and frustration long ago from 19th century
English law. The Restatement, Article 2 of the Uniform
Commercial Code (UCC), and our case law have expanded
impossibility into impracticability, but there has been little
other change in the law as written.
Of course, the law written is seldom the law applied.
And any reader of a few cases on mistake or supervening
causes appreciates how sloppy the stM}dards on what is
a sufficient mistake, an adequate frustration, or a large
enough impracticability to void a contract really are. One
man's frustration is another's hard bargain . Without a
more extensive reading of the cases than we had had time
to do, one cannot be sure that the practice is the same as
before Alcoa, but we see no evidence of any general willingness to void contracts that would have been enforced
before Alcoa.
In the take or pay cases, almost every court held
buyers to their contracts. Witness the desperate act of
the Columbia Gas Pipeline that threw itself into Chapter
11 because it could find no other way to avoid several
thousand losing contracts to buy gas at above market
prices. Buyers of coal fared no better than the buyers of
gas, they too were made to pay above market prices when
their sellers' clever contracts caused the contract prices to
rise far above spot prices. The same holds true for leases
and other miscellaneous contracts.
There is no evidence in the cases of the last two decades
that the courts have become more receptive to pleas of
mistake or supervening changes. If anything, the lessons of
the game theorists may be sinking in. We now appreciate
more than before that parties at the time of contracting
and later will respond to the events considered here. The
manifold shocks to the commodities market since 1960 are
now known to every negotiator of a long-term commodity
contract. That the courts have not welcomed pleas for
avoidance must also be known to these negotiators. With
this knowledge any sensible negotiator should reexamine
his behavior. Some may eschew long-term contracts in the
gas market, but it is only the long-term that makes price
diversions large and unbearable. Others may be more
careful or not as greedy in negotiating escalation clauses.
And, of course, careful students of the cases might even
learn about the kinds of clauses that work and those that do
not.
Judges' familiarity with the waves of volatility that first
roiled the uranium, then the oil, and later the gas, coal,
and electricity markets, in order has made them progressively more skeptical about parties' claims of cataclysm.
Better than before, the courts appreciate that any judicial
outcome - whether it is avoidance or refusal to avoid
- is more likely to be followed by renegotiation of the

contract than by ruin or bankruptcy. If the contract still
makes sense for the parties, they are likely to continue
even after a court rules for one or the other. That ruling
will affect the form of the renegotiation (with the winner
in court getting a larger share of the surplus from the
contract), but judicial modification of the contract is not
necessary for the parties to carry on.
In these cases we see just a hint that the courts are
getting harder, not softer, that they are more, not less,
likely to leave the parties in their contract than formerly.
Whether this phenomenon is because of the writing of
people like Jack Dawson, because the most prominent
cases have led the way, or because the courts believe the
economists, we don't know, but we see no weakening of
the judicial spine.
Jack, of course, was concerned principally with the
court's remedy in Alcoa, not with that or any other court's
conclusion about the presence of mistake, impracticability, or the like. But the issues are inseparable; since
no offending remedy can be imposed without a find of
mistake, impracticability or the like, the courts' attitude
about the latter are bound to the former. No impracticability, mistake or frustration - no basis to rewrite the
contract.

Modifying contracts
Whatever the wisdom of letting Alcoa escape the
letter of its contract and whatever the propriety of using
"mistake" as the theory, the revolutionary part of the Alcoa
decision was JudgeTeitelbaum's rewriting the contract
price formula to give Alcoa a small profit per pound.
That was the act that made Jack apoplectic, that attracted
the academic writers, and that put Alcoa into most of the
contracts casebooks.
We have no case that follows Alcoa. Two judges, one
concurring in a West Virginia Supreme Court case and one
a federal magistrate judge in New Jersey, embrace the rule.
In Unihealth v. U.S. Healthcare ( 1998), Magistrate Judge
Pisano had to resolve a contract dispute between a hospital
and an HMO that had agreed to send its members to the
hospital in return for a reduction in the hospital's normal
fees. Normally, the hospital charged patients according to
a flat fee that corresponded to the patient's condition, the
patient's "Diagnostic Group" (DRG). The DRG provided
a flat rate for a service whether the patient required a
longer or a shorter stay in the hospital than average or
whether the patient required more or less service than
the average person with that particular condition or need
for treatment. Instead of DRG payments, the HMO
bargained for per diem payments. Both the hospital and the
HMO believed the per diem payments would be smaller

than the DRG billing would be. To protect against an
excessive reduction in the payments that it would receive,
the hospital bargained for a restriction on the discount
that would be enjoyed by the HMO. That clause read as
follows: "If the overall discount for all inpatients exceeds
40 percent ... U.S. Healthcare will reimburse [hospital]
monies beyond the 40 percent discount .. .."
The parties interpreted the "discount" to mean the
difference between the DRG charge and the per diem charge
for the same service that was provided in the contract.
In 1993 New Jersey abolished the DRG system; that left
the discount formula without a minuend from which to
subtract the actual per diem charge of the HM 0 . Using
its "normal revenue" charge, in lieu of the DRG charges
for 1993, the hospital claimed the HMO owed an adjustment of more than $500,000 because the "discount" had
exceeded 40 percent by that amount. Of course, the higher
the normal charges or revenues, the larger the excess of
40 percent.
Finding that the circumstances fit within Section 265
of the Second Restatement of Contracts on Supervening
Frustration, the court concludes that "neither party should
be subject to the harsh results proposed by the other party,
since neither assumed the risk of the repeal [of the DRGs)."
Seeking a remedy, the court cites JudgeTietelbaum's
holding that "the appropriate remedy in a case involving
a frustrated contract was to modify the contractual price
term ." Magistrate Pisano also asserts that his case falls
"snugly within the ambit of Sections 204 and 272 of the
Restatement."
The court then exhorts the parties to negotiate a settlement and appoints a master to determine the reasonable
value of the hospital's service in 1993 to be used if the
parties fail to agree on a number for that year.
Despite this warm embrace of Alcoa, this is not in any
sense an Alcoa case. First, as the court notes, the case
would be perfect for applying Section 2-305 of the UCC
by analogy. That section directs a court to apply a "reasonable price" where "the price is to be fixed in terms of some
agreed market or other standard as set or recorded by a
third person or agency and it is not so set or recorded."
This is only the familiar case of a failed formula. Indeed the
court's finding of frustration is unnecessary to the conclusion that the price should now be a reasonable price.
The case differs from Alcoa in a second important way.
Here the parties had performed and the plaintiff was
merely asking for an interpretation of the contract that the
defendant owed $500,000. Since the contract had expired,
neither party needed rules to govern continued future
performance of the contract .
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The needless commentary on frustration and Alcoa
removed, Unihealth is a thoroughly conventional case
where a judge must decide what a contract means and
whether the plaintiff has proved its case. For these reasons,
it does not bear Alcoa's genes.
Like Unihealth, McGinnis v. Clayton (312 S.E.2d 765,
780 [W Virginia 19841) has a lot of Alcoa talk, but no Alcoa
holding. In McGinnis, the plaintiffs were the successors to
a West Virginia landowner who leased his oil and gas in
189 3. The lease required the lessee to pay a one-eighth
royalty on oil but gave the lessee the right to gas for $ I 00
per year, which in 1893 had no commercial value. When a
deepened well began to produce commercial quantities of
gas in 1978, the lessor's successors sued to void the lease
on the ground that it was no longer "commercially reasonable."The lower court dismissed and the Supreme Court
reversed.
Noting the possibility that the plaintiffs might bring
themselves within the rule of a 19th century case that
avoided a 99-year lease for timber and coal because the
parties had been mutually mistaken about the presence of
mineable coal on the property, the majority reversed the
lower court's dismissal. The higher court was particularly
careful to make no finding about the continued vitality of
the mutual mistake doctrine in such a case and took pains
to explain that it was merely giving the plaintiffs a chance
to establish a "record."
The indorsement of Alcoa comes from concurring
Justice Harshbarger. Criticizing the "limited scope" of the
majority opinion, Justice Harshbarger ranges widely over
commercial impracticability, supervening events, unjust
enrichment, and even unconscionability. Citing articles
by Professors Macneil and Speidel, Justice Harshbarger
suggests that Alcoa is merely a form of"equitable adjustment [that) is itself an evolved form of'reformation."'
At least implying that he would use the Alcoa theory to
change the gas royalty, the justice reasons that Alcoa's
"rationale is useful when applied to a contract such as the
McGuinnises' ."
Notwithstanding its elegance and wide range, Justice
Harshbarger's opinion remains only a concurring opinion .
Moreover, it concurs with a majority opinion that is far
from encouraging for the plaintiffs. The majority offers
only the smallest hope to the plaintiff:
"[A]n appellate court's decision to overturn the granting
of a [motion for summary judgment] does not reflect an
opinion on the ultimate merits of the case. The majority
even casts doubt on the court's own 19th century opinion
on which the plaintiffs rely.
"Although appellants are entitled to a hearing, to prevail
they must establish mutual mistake as a legally sufficient
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ground for rescission or reformation of the contract. It is
true that in Bluestone Coal, supra [18 S.E. 493 [1893], we
stated that, 'Nothing is more clear than the doctrine that
a contract founded in a mutual mistake of the facts constituting the very basis or essence of it will avoid it.' ...
Nevertheless, this court has not had occasion to address the
mutual mistake question in some time, and we note that the
doctrine has been applied in disparate ~ays in other jurisdictions ... we content ourselves with ruling that appellant's
allegations raise a potentially meritorious argument ...."
A careful listener to the majority opinion might hear the
court saying: "Dismissal is the right outcome, but you have
to give the fellow a hearing first."
Some of the judicial critics of Alcoa have been explicit
about their disagreement. In Printin9 Industries Association v.
International Printin9 and Graphic Communications Union (584
F. Suppl. 990 [N.D. Ohio 19841), Judge Battisti states that
he is "at odds with the reasoning and result in Alcoa . . ..
The willingness of courts to reform contracts on the basis of
subsequent knowledge may undermine the policy of finality
which is so essential and revered in the contract law."
In Wabash v.Avnet (516 F. Supp. 995 [N.D. Ill. 19811),
Judge Shadur speaks to Jack Dawson's concern: "[u]nder
the logical consequences of that case there would be no
predictability or certainty for contracting parties who
selected a future variable to measure their contract
liability. Whichever way the variable fluctuated, the
disapppointed party would be free to assert frustrated
expectations and seek relief via reformation." A handful of
other cases content themselves with distinguishing Aloca.
Most of those do not address the rewriting; they deal with
the finding of mistake.
After only seven years one writer found that Alcoa had
"virtually faded into obscurity...." I suspect that the only
thing that keeps Alcoa on stage is its presence in some of
the current casebooks. It remains a favorite of contracts
casebook writers; in casebooks the embers often linger
long after the fire has subsided elsewhere.

Conclusion
Jack Dawson's worry that Alcoa was the first of many
steps down the path followed by the Germans was wrong,
but why?Why have the American courts not followed
the Germans? Our judiciary is a conservative institution
- but surely not more so than the German judiciary. Let
us try two hypotheses.
First the Germans may be the victims of listening
too well to Santayana. Remember, "[t]hose who cannot
remember the past are condemned to repeat it." One
corollary to that rule is that those who remember the past
too well may become its prisoners. As Jack pointed out in

Oracles ef the Law, judicial creativity is a·necessity if the law
is to retain its vitality; judges must recognize and respond
to changing circumstances. Just as armies fight the previous
war, central banks sometimes do what worked in the
previous recession, and businesses revert to strategies that
worked the last time. In retrospect, these calls on history
are often found to be misguided because the later circumstances differ from the earlier.
That might also be true of the German judiciary, many
of whom must have had personal recollections of the 1920s
and 1930s. German courts' revalorizing and other modification of contracts with and without legislative authority
during the hyperinflation after the First War was a living
precedent. Even Jack Dawson acknowledged that behavior
in those circumstances to have been necessary and appropriate. But the courts of the 1950s ignored the corollary;
they applied the lesson of yesterday (1924) to the present
( 1950) and, at least according to Jack, made a bad mistake.
The American courts have been saved from violating
Santayana's corollary not because they are smarter or
more insightful ~tudents of history than the Germans, but
because of their ignorance of and remoteness from comparable American social and legal history. As Dawson's very
first publication in this Review shows, both Southern and
Northern courts revalorized land and otherwise rewrote
contracts immediately after the Civil War when contracts
made in Confederate currency had to be adjusted first
for the decline in that currency's value and then for its
abolition. Even if the post-Civil War history were well
known, it would not have had as powerful an effect on the
American courts as the much more recent experience had
on the Germans. So perhaps we have been saved from the
Germans' fate both by our disregard for history and by the
remoteness of events.
There is a second hypothesis that might explain
American courts' refusal to rewrite contracts in cases
where the Germans would do so. Perhaps our shocks
- shortages of oil, gas, and the like - are of a different
magnitude than those that hit Europe in the 20th century.
Commodity shortages are one thing, fighting across one's
soil as the French, Russians, Germans, and others did, and
suffering the bombing that was experienced by the British
and much of Europe, is something else. If either of the
world wars had been fought on American soil, the stress
on our economy would have far exceeded that imposed by
rising oil prices. Having been spared from fighting on our
own soil since I 865, we should be slow to claim superiority for our legal doctrine. Had either of the wars been
fought here, we too might have had a recent precedent for
appropriate contract rewriting that our courts might have
extended to inappropriate cases.

For the time being, the threat to freedom of contract
that Jack saw in Alcoa has receded . No courts have
followed its holding and only a few judges have embraced
its reasoning. Even in the law schools it may be losing its
hold. Though ignorance may on occasion save us from
mechanical application of the lessons of history, it does
not excuse willful ignorance of our legal heritage. If we
choose, despite Jack's admonitions, to ignore the lesson
of Alcoa, we cannot be too confident that future, stronger
shocks might not resurrect it.
This article ventures some of our tentative hypotheses about the development of the law of frustration in
the United States. Were Jack Dawson still with us, he
undoubtedly could bring to bear his legal expertise, depth
of historical knowledge, and insight into the vagaries of the
human condition. His writing is a testament to hard work
and wisdom born of experience over a six-decade career.
If these hypotheses need further refinement, we can
imagine no better way to start the process than talking to
Jack Dawson over a drink of whisky on a Sunday morning.

James J. White, '62, the Robert A. Sullivan Prefessor

ef Law, is a 9raduate efAmherst Colle9e and the University ef
Michi9an Law School. He practiced privately in Los An9eles
and be9an his academic career at the University ef Michi9an in
1964. Prefessor White has written on many aspects ef commercial law and has published the most widely reco9nized treatise on
the Uniform Commercial Code, Handbook of the Law Under
the Uniform Commercial Code (with Summers, 1995, 4th
ed.). He is also the author ef several casebooks on commercial,
bankruptcy, and bankin9 law. Prefessor White has served as the
reporterfar the Revision efArticle 5 ef the Uniform Commercial
Code; he is a member ef the National Coeference ef Commissioners
on Uniform State Laws and has served on several American Law
Institute and NCCUSL committees dealin9 with revision to the
Uniform Commercial Code. He received the L. Hart Wri9ht
Awardfor Excellence in Teachin9for 2001 -02.Amon9 courses he
recently has tau9ht are Payment Systems, Secured Transactions,
and Ne9otiation.

David A. Peters completed his third year ef le9al studies
at the Law School this academic year and 9raduated in May. He
holds an M.A .jrom the University ef Chica90 and a B.A.jrom the
Colle9e efWilliam and Mary.

A Footnote for Jack Dawson
LQN Spring 2003

I 89

